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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between family and founding family ownership, government link companies (GLC) 
ownership, foreign ownership and widely dispersed ownership and segment disclosure provided by Malaysian listed 
firms. This study presents a more detailed analysis of segment information disclosure by utilizing both financial and non-
financial data to compute the segment disclosure index that is a more robust measure of segment disclosure. We find that 
the increase in the family and founding family ownership influences the segment disclosure, while the GLC, foreign 
ownership and widely dispersed ownership have no significant effect on the segment disclosure. We also find that size of 
the audit firm; listing status and leverage have a significant effect on the segment disclosure. 
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1. Introduction 
 The emergence of globalised economies have changed the way the financial information is prepared 
in the form of consolidated financial statements in order to cater for the growing internationalization of 
market trade and the  prospect of most highly diversified, conglomerates and multinational companies. The 
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consolidated financial statement is very crucial in showing the overall profitability, risk and the potential 
growth of the firms. In some ways the quality of financial information is useful to investors and analysts who 
undeniably rely heavily on such information in deliberating and comprehending how the various components 
of a complex enterprise behave economically. Therefore, the growing diversification and complexity of 
business enterprise, have called for the adoption of international accounting standards (now referred to as 
International Financial Reporting Standards) on segment disclosure which are perceived to add value to the 
firms’ financial reporting and thus satisfy the needs of most users. However, the quality of segment 
disclosures is found to decline in terms of value relevance as the firms incline to hide certain information 
regarding the segment activities. Nevertheless, the use of segment information in investment analysis is 
indisputable (AIMR, 1993). Thus the demand for better disaggregated segment information is very essential 
in assessing firm performance [Chartered Financial Analysts Institute (CFAI), (2006)]. The segment 
information is extremely important but the information provided by firms is average to below average in 
quality and has declined tremendously.  
 Prior research has investigated several issues regarding segment reporting but no study has yet 
examined the impact of various ownership structures on the extent of segment disclosure. Ownership structure 
remains as a matter of concern in most emerging market such as Malaysia, where there is concentrated 
ownership and control by a major shareholder, either family or state. Agency theorists posit a separation of 
ownership and control of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), causing potential agency problems resulting 
from conflicts of interest between the management and owners. The agency problem can be categorized as 
TYPE I and TYPE II. Type I agency problem indicates the effect of misalignment between management and 
owners and Type II agency problem indicates the entrenchment effect between majority owner and minority 
owners. In the case of Type I agency problem: “Alignment effect”, there is a separation of ownership and 
control of the firm and corporate management. The agency costs arise when the shareholders invest in the 
business but do not playing an active role in the management of the firm. As a result the managers has 
opportunity to act not in the best interest of the owner; “managers opportunism”. In the Type II agency 
problem: “Entrenchment effect”, occurs when the owners are also the managers. Generally, this phenomenon 
occurs mostly in   family firms. The owners tend to be predators to the minority shareholders; “owner 
opportunism” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Morck and Yeung, 2003).  
 In prior literature the effect of ownership on disclosures are discussed from two broad areas aspects: 
affect either on voluntary or mandatory disclosures which is proxies for transparency. The mandatory 
disclosures represent the minimum information required to be disclosed in the annual report, whilst voluntary 
disclosure refers to the additional information over and above the mandatory disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001) 
which basically can be accessed from the chairman’s report, management discussion and analysis and 
operational and financial result. Moreover, the effect of the ownership structure on financial reporting aspects, 
including disclosures, has been discussed by many researchers. Among the issues raised is the effect 
associated with the concentrated ownership versus the non – concentrated ownership either in developed or 
developing countries. Fan and Wong (2002); Wang (2006); and Hashim and Devi (2008) discussed effect on 
earnings in formativeness and earnings management. Ali et. al. (2007); Huafang (2007); Chen, Chen and 
Cheng (2008); Chau and Gray (2010); investigated the effect on quality of disclosure (voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure) and Wan Hussein (2009) examined  the effect on the early, full and half adopters of 
segment disclosure. Most of the prior studies proved that the entrenchment effect of the concentrated 
ownership,, consisting of founding family firm and family firm, tend to be different. The entrenchment effect 
of founding family firms shows they are “less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviour in reporting 
accounting earnings because it potentially could damage the family's reputation, wealth and long-term firm 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988 and Morck and Young, 2003) and 
family firm instead are inclined to report high quality financial information. Prior studies also discussed the 
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impact of large ownership structure such as the effect of institutional ownership or block ownership (Jiang, 
Habib and Hu, 2010) on the voluntary disclosure. However, the prior studies’ investigation on segment 
disclosures has not considered the impact of the various ownership structures using a comprehensive measure 
of segment disclosure. 
Therefore, this study  investigates the effect of the various ownership structures on the extent of segment 
disclosure. The dimensions of ownership structure  in this study are shown to have strategic implications for 
the firms  and the way management exercises power over the firms’ economic activities which is related to the 
firms’ segment activities. This study differs from Hussein (2009) which uses the level of adopters as proxy of 
transparency. Instead, in this study the extent of segment disclosure is measured by the segment disclosure 
index (SDI) which is developed using  the financial and non–financial information disclosed by the firm as 
required presently under  Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 114 and other disclosures in the chairman’s 
statement or in management discussion and analysis. The purpose of extending the research instrument by 
including the content analysis approach as a tools to aids our understanding of the type of segment 
information that the organization are disclosing in their annual report so that we could investigate the extent 
of segment disclosure more comprehensively. The detailed  investigation of  elements  segment activities’ 
disclosures from various sources within the annual report ensures a more robust effort to seek evidence 
whether  the firms  choose to remain opaque and reluctant to disclose high quality of segment disclsore as a 
result of the  ownership structure.   
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1.  Managerial Ownership 
It is evidenced that the disclosure orientation is very much influenced by the ownership type (Gelb, 2000). 
Managerial ownership is a type of ownership whereby the CEO or executive directors have certain percentage 
of ownership in the firms. In the case of managerial ownership, it is recognized as being crucial in generating 
greater alignment of interest between the management and shareholder (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 
1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The alignment effect arises due to fact that the increased shareholding by 
management may affect the control over the board. Hence, the traditional agency problem can be mitigated by 
enhancing the managerial ownership and thus increasing the managers’ incentive to provide more disclosure. 
Eng and Mak (2003) confirm this notion and show that lower managerial ownership has a negative effect on 
voluntary disclosure. Therefore, in the case of segment reporting we expect that the alignment effect between 
controlling owners and minority shareholder will give the controlling owners an incentive to avoid detailed 
financial information given the discretionary nature of the segment reporting standard.              
H1: There is a negative relationship between the managerial ownership and the extent of segment 
disclosure.  
2.2. Family and Founding Family Ownership 
In the case of the East Asian countries the controlling–shareholders holding more than 50% ownership is 
common and the separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms 
(Thillainathan, 1999; Clessens et. al. 2000). Especially, the disclosure orientation of firms in Hong Kong and 
Singapore is influenced by the form of their ownership and management structure (Lam, Mok, Cheung, & 
Yam, 1994; Mok, Lam, & Cheung, 1992). However, in developing countries such as Malaysia the managerial 
ownership is predominantly more likely to occur when the manager is a founder of the firm or member of 
founding family (Classen et. al. 2002). The listed firms are usually controlled by a family group rather than 
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institutional investors. Even in Malaysia and Thailand most of the listed firms is controlled by family.  Morck 
(1996) argued that closely held firms are better able to engage in political lobbying than widely held firms. 
The family–controlled firms have limited incentive to disclose segment information over and above the 
mandatory requirement as compared to the widely –held firms. In the case of family firms, the owner- 
managers have created Type II (entrenchment effect) agency cost whereby the control held by the owner–
managers over whelm the minority shareholder (Morck et. al. 1988; Morck, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Morck and Yeung, 2003).  Wang (2006) evidenced that family firm’s report better quality of earnings in 
terms of lower absolute abnormal accrual, larger earnings and less persistent loss components. While Ali et. 
al. (2007) shows that family firms have larger earnings response coefficient, less positive discretionary 
accrual, greater predictability of cash flows and provide voluntary disclosure of bad news through earnings 
signal. Similarly, Jaggi et. al. (2007) show that the monitoring quality by the outside directors is reduced in 
family–firms which consequently lower the quality of reported earnings in Hong Kong. We therefore, 
hypothesize that family-firms have less incentive to disclose higher level of segment disclosure due to lower 
demand for this information and due to the discretion held by the owner – manager in making this disclosure:  
H2: There is a negative association between family and founding family ownership and the extent of 
segment disclosure. 
2.3. Government Link Corporation (GLC) Ownership 
The Government Link Corporation (GLC) is a type of corporation that is controlled by the Malaysian 
government via the Federal Government – Linked Investment Companies (GLICs). According to Putrajaya 
Committee GLC (PCG) high performance, (2007) GLCs are defined as companies that have a primary 
commercial objective and in which the Malaysian Government has a direct controlling stake through 
Khazanah, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP), and Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM). The GLCs are also controlled by other federal government linked agencies such as 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and Tabung Haji. Apart from 
percentage ownership, controlling stake also refers to the government’s ability to appoint board members, 
senior management and make major decisions (e.g. contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, 
acquisitions and divestments etc.) for GLCs either directly or through Government Link Investment 
Companies (GLICs).The role played by the GLC in the selected firms is that they have a right to appoint the 
members on boards of directors, as well as monitoring and controlling the decisions made by the boards. The 
government connection in the firms is mainly through share ownership, subsidizing activities, tax incentives 
and grants. In Malaysia the Government-linked companies (GLCs) dominate several sectors of the economy 
and account for 34% of the market capitalization of the Bursa Malaysia (Asian Development Outlook 2004 
Update, Silver Book, 2006). The government share ownership is mainly affected through the government 
linked companies which are expected to have greater disclosure in order to mitigate the higher agency cost 
and to monitor any dysfunctional governance structure of the companies that they hold the ownership. In fact, 
Eng and Mak (2003), evidence significant relationship between government ownership with increased 
disclosure.    
H4: There is a positive association between the GLC ownership structure and the extent of segment 
disclosure  
2.4. Foreign Ownership  
The foreign ownership is a type of ownership whereby the companies have certain percentage of foreign 
investors that invest in the domestic market. The foreign investors, who are likely to be less informed investor 
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and coming from more transparent regimes may demand for high disclosure of financial information as 
compared to the local investor who are more informed and may be able to access the financial information 
that they need. The high disclosure of corporate information may reduce the incentives for the investors to 
pay more for costly private information. However,  Ananchoticul (2007) and Mangena and Tauringana 
(2007)  found that foreign investors tend to become part of insider shareholders when they have control over 
the firm and react like other local investors which result in weak corporate governance and consequently 
result in low level of disclosure. Unlike the other developing countries Malaysian firms generally have low 
level of foreign ownership as stated by Abdul Samad (2002) that foreign shareholdings comprise of 5.01 
percent in Malaysian public listed companies. Hence, these foreign investors are expected to react more alike 
the minority shareholders concerning the disclosure, in which they prefer firms to provide high disclosure in 
turn to protect their investments. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) in their study found a significant relationship 
between corporate social disclosures. Hence we expect a positive association between the foreign ownership 
and extent of segment disclosure.  
H5: There is a positive association between the foreign ownership and extent of segment disclosure  
2.5. Widely dispersed ownership  
Widely dispersed ownership is a type of ownership that has diverse shareholder bases. Widely dispersed 
ownership is a dichotomy set of ownership with the concentrated ownership. In some cases the widely 
dispersed ownership are named as modern type of business structure. Widely-held firms were first studied by 
Bearle and Means (1932) who showed that the typical large corporation in the US has become widely 
dispersed among a very large number of small shareholders. The shareholding of many large corporations 
were found to be very small indeed – in percentage terms – often less than 1% of the voting stock. Berle and 
Means (1932) exerted that no shareholding could be sufficiently powerful to be able to influence the 
management and that therefore such companies could not meaningfully be considered to be controlled by 
their owners. Theoretically dispersed ownership increase the agency costs the consequently effect the degree 
of information asymmetry between the organization and its shareholders which indeed bring an adverse 
investor reaction. As a result Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that dispersed ownership structure may have 
incentive to provide more segment information to shareholders. In the study done by Chau and Gray (2002), 
and Hannifa and Cooke (2002) find a positive relationship between the dispersed ownership and voluntary 
disclosure, while others support a negative relationship (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006) 
or even no association (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003). Given these mixed result in predicting the sign of the 
relationship between dispersed ownership and segment disclosure. Hence, we posit the following hypotheses. 
H6: There is a positive association between widely-held ownership and the extent of segment disclosure  
3. Methodology 
The selection of the sample firms is from Malaysian listed firms on Bursa Malaysia.  The unit of analysis used 
is an annual report of the listed firms taken from securities commission listing website (Street et. al. 2000) and 
also from the CompuStat database. This comprehensive research data is taken for sample firms covering the 
annual report from the financial period (years) end of 2008. The sample data is taken from the end 2008 
because Malaysia introduced significant institutional changes since 2007 to strengthen the corporate 
governance climate as well as moving to convergence of accounting standards with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards. The data is selected from the annual reports of groups that is likely to contain a high 
percentage of foreign operations [Nichlos and Street (2007), Tsakumis et. al (2006) and Boonlert U (2006)]. 
The data is selected from listed firms from all category of industry excluding companies operating in banking, 
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finance, trust and insurance industry since these firms’ are highly regulated and governed by the Central Bank 
(reference). In addition, the listed firms must disclose both/either line of business segment and geographic 
segment consistently in their annual reports and these firms have consistent accounting year-end.  
3.1. Segment Disclosure Index  
The segment disclosure index is address the issue that the financial disclosure is too abstract that cannot be 
measured directly as stated by Cooke and Wallace (1989). It is suggested t the use of an index can be a proxy 
in getting the overall quality of financial information disclosed by firms. In this study, the robust disclosure 
index is developed directly through self–constructed index based on the mandatory disclosure checklist in 
accordance to the IAS 14 (R) and the voluntary–disclosure checklist developed by Wang, Sewon and 
Clairborn (2008). The checklist is based on the relevant disclosure requirement of Malaysian firms listed in 
Bursa Malaysia and a review of relevant literature. The segment disclosure index is aspired by the content 
analysis method which is commonly done in measuring the other accounting disclosures such as corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) (Amran and Devi, 2008; and Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). However no study has 
used content analysis in measuring the extent of segment disclosure. The purpose of using content analysis as 
way of measuring the extent of segment disclosure is to ensure that extent of segment disclosure is measured 
more objectively, systematic and reliable as stated by Krippendorf (1980) and Guthrie and Parker (1990). As 
argued by Hermann and Thomas (1997) that the extent of segment disclosure can be measured by as the 
number of financial statement disclosed per item but the tools used seems to be not robust enough and the 
extensive observation are expected in order to highlight in the narrative statement regarding the segment 
disclosure. As such, that the quantity and quality incorporated mutually, in the scoring system  the observation 
on financial information will be coded based on the segment element as 0 or 1 depending on whether the 
segment financial information is consistently disclosed in the annual report or not. While the non – financial 
information will be coded using the topic – based analysis method used by Robb, Single and Zarzeski (2001) 
as recommended, by the Jenkins report in Australia, Canada and the US. Whereby the categories used in their 
disclosure scoring sheet are based upon the list of non – financial information items desired by users which is 
used by Jenkins committee. In the case of segment disclosure the item which is highlighted as the information 
desired by user is basically 4 item namely the line of business, geographical disclosure, competitor analysis 
and market share analysis as highlighted by Chau and Gray (2002) and further extended by Wang, Sewon and 
Clairborn (2008) who provided  a detailed list of the market share analysis, discussion of industry trends – 
prior, discussion of industry trends – future and proportion of raw material purchase local other than both line 
of business and geographical quantitative disclosure. (The total of 4 non – financial in formations for segment 
disclosure and a total of 27 item of the financial information as highlighted in FRS114 were included.  
SDINX = a + β1 MANOWN + β2 FOFAM + β3 INST + β4 GLC + β5 FOREIGN + β6 WIDEDISP + ∑ Control 
Variables + "ε" j 
4. Result  and Discussion  
4.1. Descriptive Result  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics. We note that segment disclosure index shows an average of 3.7 
which is lower than the average level. The low level of segment disclosure is surprisingly unexpected as 
requirement under the accounting standard is very clear and the corporate governance initiatives require the 
management to be transparent. The level of ownership on the other hands shows that the family and founding 
family ownership contribute 11%, GLC’s contribute 3.9% of the total sample. While managerial ownership 
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contribute 12.9% of the total sample respectively. Foreign ownership forms only 3% of the total sample and 
there are 10 firms with widely-held ownership in the total sample.  
4.2. Regression Result 
Table 2 shows the result of the regression and indicate that this model is significant with the adjusted R2 0.157 
(p<0.001). This model supports the hypothesis H2, with the percentage of family and founding family 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Min Max Mean  STD  Deviation  
FFOUOWN .00 .66 .1099 .19126 
GLCOWN .00 .62 .0386 .11145 
MANOWN .00 .58 .1289 .17599 
FOROWN .00 .59 .0300 .09399 
DISPOWN .00 1.00 .1067 .30972 
SZFIRM 6.00 10.00 8.4267 .74498 
SZAUFR .00 1.00 .5667 .49720 
LISTAT 1.00 35.00 12.2667 7.11994 
LEV .00 193.96 24.4568 33.04793 
PROFIT -28.30 15.82 2.7082 6.73125 
ANALYST .00 1.00 .2533 .43638 
SDINX .06 .65 .3722 .09919 
TABLE 2: Regression  
  Beta  t Sig 
(Constant)  3.082 .002** 
FFOUOWN -.166 -1.868 .064* 
GLCOWN .026 .311 .756 
MANOWN .124 1.311 .192 
FOROWN -.120 -1.463 .146 
DISPOWN .060 .663 .508 
SZFIRM .008 .099 .921 
SZAUFR .184 2.291 .024** 
LISTAT .278 3.391 .001*** 
LEV .229 2.865 .005** 
PROFIT .029 .373 .710 
ANALYST -.017 -.217 .828 
Notes: Significance at: *10; **5; 1*** percent level 
R2                                  0.230 
Adjusted R2                              0.157 
F- Statistic                    3.127 
Sig                                0.00 
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shareholding being significant in this model, suggesting that the higher the percentage of shareholding by 
family and founding family, the lesser the extent of segment disclosure. The difference in the family and 
founding family ownership reveals the variation in the extent of segment disclosure. The other variables such 
as the size of audit firm, represented by the Big – 4 audit firms is significant, the number of years of firms’ 
listing in Bursa Malaysia and leverage also indicate significant effect on the extent are of segment disclosure. 
The significant effect of family and founding family on the extent of segment disclosure is consistent with the 
study done by Wan Hussein (2009) which shows that the family and founding family have less incentive to 
disclose all the segment information.  
5. Conclusion  
This study shows that the level of segment disclosure is not associated with GLC’s, institutional, foreign, and 
managerial and widely dispersed ownership structures. Instead the variation in the extent of segment 
disclosure is explained only by the family and founding ownership. The findings of this study suggest that the 
family and founding family ownership which represent more concentrated ownership structure as compared to 
widely dispersed ownership have an effect on the extent of segment disclosure. The findings of this result is 
not consistent in the study done by Wang (2006); Ali et. al. (2007) and Wan Hussein (2009) as their studies 
shows that the family firm is associated with a higher likelihood of increased segment disclosure. While in 
this study shows otherwise, whereby the family and founding family ownership have negative association 
with the extent of segment disclosure. In addition to that the firms that have been audited by Big 4 show an 
increase in the extent of segment disclosure. The greater the years of the firms’ listing in Bourse Malaysia the 
greater the extent of segment disclosure and the higher the level of leverage also have significant effect on the 
extent of segment disclosure.  
The point of interest to be discussed based on the result is the GLC’s that should ensure there are mechanisms 
to increase the level of segment disclosure have failed in playing their role and putting their effort to increase 
the level of transparency. The role of the managerial and foreign ownership to trigger higher segment 
disclosure are fall short and in consequences the convergence effort are not in line with the level of disclosure 
as portrayed in this study. As a result the future study upon this matter must be considered what is mediating 
and moderating factor that might contribute to the extent of segment disclosure in order to get an overall view, 
why the level of segment disclosure are very low. 
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